Sunday 27 December 2015

Sadbhavna is a humanitarian exercise, nothing else - Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain

The Army has seldom considered it necessary to explain just what Sadbhavna, its hearts and minds campaign is all about. It is now necessary in the light of increasing Separatist criticism of the noble exercise of the  Army

Gowhar Geelani, in an online essay in Catch News titled “What the row over the Army’s ‘goodwill tour’ says about Kashmir’s polity” tries vainly to explain what the Army’s ‘hearts and minds’ campaign called Sadbhavna is all about. He makes the cardinal error of misquoting me right at the beginning with the obnoxious statement – “kick them in their pants, hearts will follow”. Geelani betrays his utter lack of research and even the perception of the people of J&K about my period of stewardship of the Valley. Many military commanders around the world, involved with counter insurgency have probably used this statement which can be ascribed to nobody in general.  To put those words in the mouth of someone who tried to bring back dignity to the lives of the people in Kashmir, can only be judged by the people themselves. There is nothing more to say on this because its below dignity to even defend myself but its time Sadbhavna was clarified to not only the people of J&K but to the nation as well.
There is an increasing trend these days to question the credentials of the Army regarding its human rights record; partially brought on by greater connectivity in the cyber domain. Spreading canards too has become easier and the Army’s establishment is yet in the mode that rebuttals and explanations only exacerbate an issue not realizing they too have the technology and need only to expand the networks to enhance knowledge on the Army’s ways of dealing with national security problems.
To explain Sadbhavna (it is no longer called Op Sadbhavna, for over four years now, that is how outdated Geelani is), let me take the readers back to the days of strife in Nagaland, Punjab and even Sri Lanka. As a young sub unit commander with 120 men under me I usually established my camp in an area between a couple of villages. As an established practice the first thing was to adopt one or two villages, fraternize with the sarpanches, elders and clergy, and commence a small scale project which could give succor to the lives of the villagers. Everything was from the unit’s own resources, even medicines which my paramedic soldiers would distribute free of cost to needy villagers. The principle was from military text books – you can’t fight insurgents/militants by remaining estranged from the people from whom they have risen. Nothing will bring total friendship; after all it is their children whom you are fighting against. Yet, your fraternization will ensure that communications are open, your attitude will ensure that the militants remain in two minds and should they ever contemplate rapprochement then avenues and channels are always open. In later years we did receive some financial support for our efforts to meet expenses of medicines, reasonable meals on important national days but nothing which could make a material difference. I always found it was attitude which was the game changer; respect for women, elders and clergy always created a better environment.
When the J&K militancy commenced the Indian Army was already fresh from experience of Sri Lanka and Punjab and had years of institutional memory from the north east. There was a necessity for an institutionalized hearts and minds campaign with enshrined principles and operating procedures. J&K’s internal conflict was different, it was a proxy war sponsored from across the LoC. There was alienation and the same was being exploited by foreign terrorists. But even more importantly, and this is something the likes of Gowhar Geelani need to research, J&K’s civil administration was adversely affected by the security situation which prevailed in the state. As it is people near the border areas along the LoC depended for sustenance and essential needs upon the Army as the reach of the administration was limited. Local administrators preferred abdicating their responsibility to the Army and much of that exists to the day. That responsibility shifted inwards to the hinterland as the terror groups made it impossible for the civil administration to control certain areas. It was the Army’s outreach with medical camps which particularly endeared it and then small self-help projects like building a foot bridge. There were still very limited funds to make any material difference. The real institutionalization came in 1997 as a sequel to the understanding that the terror issue was now under semblance of control. Any self-respecting military force when confronted with a sponsored militancy of the proportions visible in J&K would be forced to employ hard power at the outset to control violence. Any professional will also tell you that the quantum of hard power has to taper off as soft power takes its place. This can be dynamic and flexible too as evident from the fact that the Army raised 27 additional units of Rashtriya Rifles (RR) after 1999 in order to stabilize the situation. Soft power is all about fraternization, outreach, succor to overcome the travails of the abnormal situation and keep a semblance of normalcy even as abnormal conditions prevail. All this helps the civil administration too to carry out its responsibilities.
Operation Sadbhavna (no longer is the prefix used) was formally launched in 1997 with a fixed budget which was allocated to each formation on the basis of the prevailing security situation. There were four primary fields selected and add ons were progressively made. Education (the main sufferer), medical facilities, small scale infrastructure and national integration were the original core areas. Later, women empowerment and human resource development apart from education became relevant themes too. Initially the coordination with civil administration was poor and duplication of efforts was evident. Progressively this got streamlined whereby the Army’s schemes and projects were coordinated with the planning departments of individual districts. The Army’s flagship achievement was in the education sector where its Army Goodwill Schools (AGS) stole the thunder in an emerging world where all parents wanted their wards to receive high quality education in clean, comfortable and safe environs. This has been the greatest contribution of the Army and I will explain why that is so, for the public. All Sadbhavna funds come from the Central Government yet all physical assets are handed over to the district administration through an elaborate procedure. However, in the case of AGS the same is retained with the Army on public demand. This ensures that the Army continues to use the ownership principle to continuously upgrade the facilities, maintain and innovate; financial management is professionally executed to build corpus for self-sustainment and maintenance of standards. The schools are run under state education rules and curriculum; something which has never been compromised. This has brought about the ire of the Separatists who see in the entire exercise the threat of better Army-Public relationship something which they assiduously work against. Without casting any aspersions on the education authorities a case in point of the Army’s deep involvement is the construction of toilet facilities for girl students in all AGS and extending this to the construction of such facilities for other government schools too; gender sensitivity is very much a part of the Army’s agenda which has no links to any of its aspirations, just the human need. In addition the Army also undertakes improvement of facilities in umpteen government schools some of which are simply two rooms for eight classes. Expansion of classrooms, provision of furniture, computer facilities and medical checkups for children is an unsaid thing. I wish the Separatists had the gumption to visit these facilities and avoid their insensitive comments in favor of continuing improvement to meet public aspirations.
In the medical field public health centers (PHCs) with virtually no medical equipment exist in many parts of J&K. The Army has provided state of the art equipment, urged the local authorities to hire doctors and paramedics and kept the facilities functional in many instances with its own manpower. Bricks of medicines for medical camps are always a priority with Sadbhavna planning and execution. These camps are conducted in way off areas where no civil doctors could ever venture on their own. It is to credit of the health authorities of J&K that the presence of medical staff alongside Army medical personnel has never been found wanting. Cataract operations for the old are conducted at Army medical facilities after initial examination of patients in the field.
In the field of gender issues and women empowerment the Army has opened facilities for rural women folk to use their talent, learn new activities and generally use their time creatively to earn some extra income for themselves; individual bank accounts have also been opened for these women to save part of their frugal earnings. The centers set up for this also impart instruction on hygiene, rights and child health.
I cannot help but mention that during the post-earthquake period in 2005-6 it was the concept of Sadbhavna and its refined procedures which helped people gather their lives and start all over again. The trust which had been built through the transparent use of funds and creation of facilities urged the local population of Uri and Tangdhar to demand that all relief work be handled only by the Army. It made the Army quite unpopular with the Separatists.  To take the argument further, in winter 2011-12 as much as during the snow tsunami of 2004-5, it was only the Army whose efforts at relief to the public went on uninterrupted. Many expectant women were evacuated from the higher reaches and deliveries done at government facilities in nearby towns and villages. No one asked the Army to clear the vehicles stranded or broken down in snow, nor did anyone react to put an end to the black marketing of mobile charging; the Army was there, first out and last in and created mobile charging facilities free of cost. Quite obviously Gowhar Geelani has never been exposed to this nor cared to research. I was not kicking people in their pants, my troops were putting themselves to discomfort to assist their countrymen just as they would do in any part of India.
We have not even come to the issue of national integration and awareness tours (the issue so vociferously raised by the Separatists), not spoken of the umpteen cricket matches, employment awareness camps, training to prepare youth for recruitment to various national and state services, training in dairy and animal husbandry or even the veterinary camps. Even more than that the very understanding of protecting the public from the ills of sponsored proxy war has never been explained to the intelligentsia of J&K. Gowhar Geelani and indeed Yasin Malik will be given all their answers in the next part of this essay.
(The writer has the vast experience of serving in J&K through seven tenures ending as the GOC of the Srinagar based 15 Corps during the challenging period of 2011-12)
feedbackexcelsior@gmail.com
 
Colonel  N K Balakrishnan ( Retd )
[Tri Services Veterans]
DAILY EXCELSIOR

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